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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff/Appellee Tiffani Barbee-Dean initiated this action by failing a Complaint

against Defendants/Appellants Shawn Turner and Advantage Title on or about January 9,
2008, for breach of contract, among other things. R.70, R.l-8. Plaintiff filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment soon after. R. 17-36. Without receiving an opposition thereto,
Plaintiff filed a Request to Submit for Decision re: Motion for Summary Judgment.
R.50-52. Plaintiff subsequently received an Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment, but believing the Opposition to be late, and believing it contained other
procedural deficiencies, filed a Motion to Strike the Opposition. R.53-58. The Trial
Court granted both the Motion to Strike the Defendants' Opposition and also granted the
Motion for Summary Judgment. R.69-76. The final order on the Motion to Strike and
Motion for Summary Judgment was entered by the Court on May 15, 2008. R. 157-159.
Defendants initiated the instant appeal on or about June 12, 2008. P.. 178-179.
Defendants assert that the contract at issue is invalid because it was not supported by
consideration. See the Brief of Appellant.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS REVIEW
The Trial Court held that the following facts were undisputed and therefore
deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3)(A).
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1.

Plaintiff/Appellee Tiffani Barbee Dean ("Dean") 1: leld ow i lersl lip in, i eal

estate in Park City, Utah (the "Property") which was secured by a mortgage from
.. .

i
1

:,

)ean transferred the Property to D e f e n d a n t Appellant A d v a n t a g e Title

vivantage , ai tiie end . ;i -1" • t in return for a promise by A d v a n t a g e to bring

the mortgage current, to pnv past due I l O A fees, to protect D . v

•• i ••

»--s

relating to the Property, and to take responsibility for all p a y m e n t s under the mortgage.
R.69-70.
Vdvantage m a d e the m o r t g a g e p a y m e n t s through August 2007. R.70.
4.

me parties executed an agreement (the " A g r e e m e n t " )

reciting the terms of the 2004 exchange. R.70.
5

Defendant/Appellant S h a w n Turner ("Tunler") personally guaranteed the

obligations of Advantage m d . - - .
6.

; !

<

0.

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Advantage and Turner agreed to
;

^ ^»: * '

failed to do so
7.

;'ivi^ .-iv

'..-.-

-'ccciiinc:

J!-

c h a n t a g e and Turner

R.H).

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, A d v a n t a g e and Turner also agreed

to pa v I )ean $ 1,000 if they had not completed tl ieir c >bligations * 'ithin foi ty se1 ; en day s :»i
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execution, and $1,000 for every thirty da)'s that passed thereafter until they paid the loan
in full. R.70.
8.

Advantage made the first three $1,000 payments, but have since stopped

paying. R.70.
9.

The Agreement provides for attorneys' fees. R.31-32; R.69-76.

10.

Dean brought suit against Advantage and Turner on or about January 9,

2008, alleging four causes of action, including (i) breach of contract; (ii) breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (iii) specific performance; and (iv) unjust
enrichment. R.70, R. 1-8.
11.

On February 20, 2008, Dean served a Motion for Summary Judgment

together with a Memorandum and the Affidavit of Tiffani Barbee-Dean in support
thereof. R. 17-36. Said pleadings were filed on February 22, 2008. R. 17-36.
12.

On March 11, 2008, Advantage and Turner filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, including the Affidavit of
Shawn Turner as an exhibit thereto. R.42-47.
13.

Dean served a Request to Submit re: Motion for Summary Judgment on

March 11, 2008, which was received and filed by the Court Clerk on March 12, 2008.
R.50-52.
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ihik time I >ean filed the Request to Submit re: Motion for Sumn

14,

Judgment, Defendants' Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment had not been
received. R.97. Moreover, at tin- '

"

iy

judgment was filed, counsel for Dean reviewed the case docket and saw no evidence of
n.*i,*n.i,,

^jeiuunis"' Opposition was not receu o by

Dean until March 17,2008. R.97.
Vssertmg that Defendants' Opposition to the Motion for Summary
l

Juu5iiient was both filed late and other pr- ed

i

- i. -

*• m ni.- i .

)

Strike Opposition together with a Memorandum in support thereof on March 24, 2008.
R..SVS8.
1 (>.

. ,.

-, ;•

Dean also filed a Reply to Defendants' Opposition to the Motion for
.!,_ ..Ui. •. .. . i „ . . . , _ . . . . M •

1 7.

•• , •

iOV-65.

On April 9, 2008, D e a n mailed a Rein •* :

'

-

. ,

which was received and filed b y the Court Clerk on Api»• I 1, 2008. R.66-68.
18.

At tl i ::' tii ! ic Dean n lailed tl le R eqi lest t : Si ill: i i lit i : : I /ilk: tioit I t : Sti ike, Dean

had not received an Opposition to the Motion to Strike I m m Advantage and Turner.
R (*X

i ikru IM

>il Ilk 1111iu" I >t•;111 mailed the Request to uibnn; »e. Motion to Strike-

counsel for Dean checked the court docket and found no evidence
the Motion to Strike from Advantage and Turner.. R.98.

7

Oi a n y \

t\)[)\

»:•»\\i\ Mi

IO

19.

Dean subsequently received an Opposition to the Motion to Strike. R.98.

20.

On April 16, 2008, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order

(filed on April 17, 2008) granting the Motion to Strike and Motion for Summary
Judgment.
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
There are essentially two issues on appeal: (i) whether the Trial Court properly
granted the Motion to Strike Defendants' Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment; and (ii) whether the Trial Court properly granted Dean's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
As to the first issue, Advantage and Turner's Opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment was filed late and the Trial Court acted within its discretion in
striking the Opposition. Moreover, the result would have been the same even if the Trial
Court had considered the Opposition as demonstrated by the Court's analysis in the
Memorandum Decision.
As to the second issue, the award of summary judgment was proper in every
respect. The Trial Court correctly determined that the Agreement constituted a
subsequent memorialization of the contract entered into by the parties in 2004. Thus, the
Agreement was supported by valid consideration made at the time of the original
contract. In the alternative, Dean's forbearance of her right to sue Advantage under the
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original contract constituted new and valid consideration, or the Agreement itself is an
accord and satisfaction of the original contract.
IV. TRIAL COURT PROPERLY STRUCK APPELLANTS' BREIF

Appellants Advantage Title Company (hereinafter "Advantage") and Shawn Turner
(hereinafter "Turner") raise the issue of whether the trial court erred in striking its Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The question of whether the trial
court erroneous struck the Advantage and Turner's brief requires a review of whether the trial
court calculated the response time correctly, and if so, whether it abused its discretion in striking
the brief.
A.

The Trial Court Properly Found that Appellants' Brief was Untimely

The first issue that must be analyzed is whether the trial court correctly concluded that
Advantage and Turner's Memorandum in Opposition to Dean's Motion for Summary Judgment
(hereinafter "Brief) was untimely. "The trial court's interpretation of the rules of civil
procedure presents a question of law which [is] review[ed] for correctness." Migliore v.
Migliore, 186 P.3d 973, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) (quoting, Nunley v. Westates Casing Services,
Inc., 989 P.2d 1077, 1090 (Utah 1999).
The time in which a response brief must be filed is governed by Rule 7 of the Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure. Rule 7 (c)(1) states that "[wjithin ten days after sendee of the motion and
supporting memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in opposition."
U.R.C.P. 7(c)(1). Advantage and Turner argue that the trial court erred in finding that their

9

Brief was timely because the Brief was filed on February 20, 2008 and therefore Advantage and
Turner's Brief was timely when it was served on March 20, 2008. It is undisputed that Dean's
Motion for Summary Judgment was served upon February 20, 2008 (R.18), therefore any
opposition to the motion needed to be filed by March 10, 2008. Nevertheless, Advantage and
Turner's argument fails because they calculate the end of the time period in which they could
oppose the motion upon the service of the Brief, not upon the filing of the Brief with the trial
court.
In defining the time period in which a party may respond to a motion, Rule 7
conspicuously uses the verb "service" to identify the start of the time period, and the verb "file"
to identify the end of the time period. Advantage and Turner did not file their Brief until March
11, 2008. R. 42.

Therefore, because Advantage and Turner did not file their Brief the trial

court correctly concluded that it was untimely.

B.

The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Striking Appellants' Brief

Since it is undisputed that Advantage and Turner did not file their Brief by the March 10,
2008 due date, the next issue that must be analyzed is whether the trial court properly struck
Advantage and Turner's Brief

A trial court's application of the rule to trie facts of the case is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Aris Vision Institute, Inc. \. Wasatch Property
Management, Inc., 121 P.3d 24, 28 (Utah CL App. 2005). A trial court abuses its discretion
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when "it has exceeded the range of discretion allowed for the particular act under review."
Rivera ex rel. Rivera v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Inc. Co., 1 P. 3d 539, 542 n.2 (Utah 2000).
In the present case the trial court did not exceed the range of its discretion allowed in
striking Advantage and Turner's Brief. It is within the trial court's discretion to enforce the rules
of civil procedure. The trial court acted within its range of discretion when it stuck Advantage
and Turner's Brief because it was not filed within the time period set forth under Rule 7 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
C.

If the Trial Court Erred in Striking the Appellants' Brief, it was Harmless
Error

Even if the trial court erred by striking Advantage and Turner's Brief, the error was
harmless. "[H]armless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no
reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings. Put differently, an error is
harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high that it undermines our
confidence in the verdict." State v. Evans, 20 P.3d 888, 892-93 (Utah 2001) (citations omitted).
In the present case, any error that may have occurred in striking Advantage and Turner's
Brief is harmless if the trial court would have reached the same conclusion if the Brief had been
included. Albrecht v. Bennett, 44 P.3d 838, 844 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (the Court of Appeals
found that the dismissal of a compliant with prejudice was harmless error since "the trial court
would have undoubtedly granted summary judgment and therefore effectively dismissed the
complaint as a matter of law."). The trial court clarified that it would have granted summary
judgment even if it had considered Advantage and Turner's Brief. The trial court stated in its
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memorandum decision that "[e]ven if the Court were to consider the Defendants' opposition,
however, the Plaintiff would still be entitled to summary judgment on her claim for breach of
contract." R. 71-72.
Therefore, since any error on the part of the trial court in striking Advantage and Turner's
Brief was harmless, the Court of Appeals does not need to reach the merits of Advantage and
Turner's claim that its Brief should not have been stricken.
D.

Appellants' Claim that the Trial Court Erred in Striking its Brief is Moot

Advantage and Turner's claim that the trial court erred in striking its Brief is moot. "An
issue on appeal is considered moot when the requested relief cannot affect the rights of the
litigants." State v. Simrns, 881 P.2d 840, 841 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted). Advantage and
Turner's claim that the trial court erred in striking its Brief is moot because their rights would not
be affected if this Court found that it should have not been stricken.
Advantage and Turner's Brief only contested one of Dean's statements of fact. R. 69,
n. 1. For the purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment the trial court assumed the truth of
Advantage and Turner's version of the contested statement of fact. Id. Therefore, the trial
court's granting of Dean's Motion for Summary Judgment is based upon it application of law to
the undisputed facts. Advantage and Turner now request this Court to review the trial court's
application of the law to the undisputed facts. This Court's review of the trial court's application
of the law to the undisputed of facts is not dependent upon, or limited by, the striking of
Advantage and Turner's brief. Therefore, because Advantage and Turner's substantive rights are
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not affected by the striking of their Brief, the issue is moot and should not be considered by this
Court.
V. SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT WAS
APPROPRIATE
Advantage and Turner argue that the Trial Court's award of summary judgment
was inappropriate for two reasons: (i) the Agreement was invalid because it was not
supported by consideration; and (ii) issues of material fact existed precluding summary
judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. As is set forth below,
Advantage and Turner's arguments are without merit and the Trial Court's award of
summary judgment should be upheld by this Court.
A.

The Agreement Was Supported By Consideration

The Agreement is valid and binding and summary judgment was therefore
appropriate. Advantage and Turner argue that summary judgment was inappropriate
because the Agreement did not constitute a valid contract as Dean did not provide any
consideration for the Agreement. This is demonstrably incorrect. As is set forth below,
consideration was provided by Dean and the Agreement merely constitutes a
memorialization of that contract. In the alternative, new consideration was provided for
the Agreement or the Agreement constituted an accord and satisfaction.
1.

The Agreement constitutes a memorialization of the contract and
was supported by valid consideration

13

Summary Judgment was proper because the Agreement constitutes the
memorialization of a contract supported by valid consideration. Advantage and Turner
admit that Dean transferred the Property to Advantage and Turner at the end of 2004 in
return for a promise from Advantage and Turner to satisfy certain obligations as set forth
above. R.42. It is undisputed that Advantage and Turner breached the Agreement.
R.70. Advantage and Turner's only defense is that the Agreement is unenforceable
because it was unsupported by consideration.
Advantage and Turner argue that the transfer of the Property to them by Dean
could not have constituted the consideration for the Agreement because the transfer
occurred in 2004 and the Agreement was entered into by the parties in 2007. R.43.
Thus, Advantage and Turner argue that despite the facts that the 2004 exchange and the
Agreement involve the same parties, the same Property and the same obligations, they are
somehow two separate transactions. This argument fails.
Indeed, Advantage and Turner admit that the 2004 transfer of the Property by
Plaintiff "was in return for [Defendants'] promises to make the mortgage payment
..." R.43 (emphasis added). The fact that the contract for the 2004 exchange was not
reduced to writing until the Agreement does not make the bargained-for consideration
invalid. Rather, the Agreement is merely the belated memorialization of the contract
entered into in 2004, which was actually performed and relied upon by Dean.
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The Agreement itself is unambiguous and conclusively demonstrates that it
constitutes a memorialization of the 2004 contract. The Agreement identifies the
Property conveyed by Dean to Advantage in 2004. R.31-32. The Agreement recognizes
that the Advantage and Turner accepted certain obligations as set for therein. R.31-32.
The Agreement sets forth that Advantage and Turner had partially performed the
obligations assumed. R.31-32. The Agreement identifies that Dean had already
transferred the Property to Advantage and Turner in exchange for the promises of
Advantage and Turner as set forth in the Agreement. R.31-32. Because the parties'
intent is easily determined from the plain language of the Agreement, the Trial Court
properly interpreted the Agreement as a matter of law. Oman v. Davis School Dist., 614
Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (2008); citing Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 84 P.3d 1134 (Utah
2003); see also Tom Heal Commercial Real Estate, Inc. v. New York, 167 P.3d 523 (Utah
App. 2007).
Moreover, Advantage and Turner's argument that the Agreement is different from
the previous contract for the 2004 exchange because it contained additional terms is not
determinative. Even assuming this argument is true, it does not invalidate the
Agreement. As the Trial Court correctly noted, "[e]ven though a binding contract is
made before a contemplated written memorial is prepared and adopted, the
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memorialization of the contract may make a binding modification of the terms previously
agreed to." R.73; citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 27 cmt. D (1981).
In addition, Advantage and Turner's strained interpretation of the Agreement, if
accepted, would prevent contracting parties from performing their obligations before
formal memorialization of the contract. "A party should be permitted to accomplish
performance prior to written memorialization without fear that the other party will claim
a lack of consideration." R.73.
Based upon the foregoing, this court should uphold the decision below and find
that the Agreement constitutes a written memorial of the contract entered into in 2004
between the parties.
2.

Alternatively, new consideration was provided for the Agreement

Even if this Court finds that the agreed upon consideration for the 2004 exchange
was somehow insufficient consideration for the Agreement, Dean arguably provided
additional consideration as well. Because the alternate consideration for the Agreement
was valid and sufficient, the outcome below remains the same, and Advantage and
Turner are liable for their breach of the Agreement.
It is well established that "[consideration is an act or promise, bargained for and
given in exchange for a promise." Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and
Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985); see also Mamvill v. Oyler, 361
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P.2d 177 (Utah 1961). "There is consideration whenever a promisor receives a benefit or
where a promisor suffers a detriment, however slight." Healthcare Services Group v.
Utah Department of Health, 40 P.3d 591, 596 (Utah 2002). Likewise, forbearance of
suing for breach of a previous contract or obligation constitutes valid consideration. See,
e.g. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Seiger, 546 P.2d 237 (Utah 1976); A.M. Castle &
Co. v. Bagley, 467 P.2d 408 (Utah 1970); Bank of Commerce v. Seely, A62 P.2d 154
(Utah 1969).
Here, the Agreement was supported by valid consideration in the form of Dean's
forbearance for suing Advantage and Turner under the contract for the 2004 exchange.
As noted above, it is undisputed that Dean transferred the Property to Advantage in 2004
in exchange for certain promises from Advantage. R.69-70. By 2007, the underlying
mortgage on the Property had not been retired and paid off by Advantage as agreed.
R.46-47. Dean therefore made demand upon Advantage to satisfy the loan in full. R.4647. Dean could have brought suit at that juncture to enforce her rights under the contract
with Advantage. Instead, however, Dean elected not to sue and entered into the
Agreement. The forbearance by Dean constitutes valid consideration for the Agreement.
Because the Agreement was supported by valid consideration, the award of
summary judgment by the Trial Court should be upheld.
3.

Alternatively, the Agreement constituted an accord and satisfaction
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Even if this Court finds that the agreed upon consideration for the 2004 exchange
was somehow insufficient consideration for the Agreement, the Agreement constitutes an
accord and satisfaction and the award of summary judgment was therefore proper.
Accord and satisfaction requires the following elements "(i) a bona fide dispute
over an unliquidated amount; (ii) a payment tendered in full settlement of the entire
dispute; and (iii) an acceptance of the payment." Estate Landscape and Snow Removal
Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 1992); citing
Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609 (Utah 1985); Masomy Equip. & Supply
v. Willco Assoc, Inc., 755 P.2d 756, 758 (Utah App. 1988). "In order for an accord and
satisfaction to have effect, it must be clear that the parties intended an accord and
satisfaction and what the extent and scope of their agreement was." Petersen v.
Petersen, 709 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 1985).
In the instant case it is undisputed that the parties entered into a contract in 2004
whereby Dean transferred the Property to Advantage. R.69-70. By 2007, the underlying
mortgage on the Property had not been retired and paid off by Advantage as agreed.
R.46-47. Dean therefore made demand upon Advantage to satisfy the loan in full. R.4647. To resolve that dispute, Dean entered into the Agreement with Advantage and
Turner. The Agreement therefore constitutes an accord and satisfaction. As such, the
Agreement is valid, binding and enforceable. The Agreement was undisputedly breached
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by Advantage and Turner, and the award of summary judgment by the Trial Court was
therefore proper in every respect.
B.

There Were No Genuine Issues Of Material Fact

Advantage and Turner argue that the Trial Court's award of summary judgment
was incorrect because there were genuine issues of material fact precluding summary
judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Brief of Appellant,
pp. 10-11. Advantage and Turner further argue that a material fact existed as to whether
the contract for the 2004 exchange and the Agreement are separate contracts, or whether
the Agreement constitutes a memorialization of the contract for the 2004 exchange. Id.
Notably, the Trial Court specifically held that the facts at issue were undisputed
because Advantage and Turner had failed to dispute them. R.69. The Trial Court also
appropriately noted that it viewed the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of
Advantage and Turner. R.72. Nevertheless, the Trial Court still concluded that the
Agreement constituted a belated memorialization of the contract for the 2004 exchange.
R.69-75. In so doing, the Court noted that "Defendants offer no evidence to support their
theory that the 2007 Agreement is independent of the 2004 exchange," and that
Advantage and Turner "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the
pleadings, but... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial." R.74.
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Indeed, all of the claims by Advantage and Turner that the 2004 exchange and the
Agreement were unrelated and separate contracts are based upon the Agreement itself,
which the Court interpreted as matter of law because the language thereof was plain and
unambiguous. R.72. The Trial Court correctly interpreted the plain language of the
Agreement within the context of all of the evidence before it, and ruled that the
Agreement constituted a memorialization of the contract for the 2004 exchange.
Accordingly, the award of summary judgment was proper in every respect and should be
upheld by this Court.
VI.

DEAN IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL
It is undisputed that the Agreement contains a provision for attorneys' fees. R.31-

32; R.69-76. The Trial Court awarded Dean her attorneys' fees in the case below. R.6976; R. 170-172. It is well established that "[t]he general rule is that when a party who
received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees
reasonably incurred on appeal." Utah Dept of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193,
1197 (Utah App. 1991); citing Management Servs. V. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d
406, 408-9 (Utah 1980); see also Valcare v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998).
Accordingly, Dean hereby requests that this Court award her the reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs she has incurred in this appeal.
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VII.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Dean respectfully requests that Advantage and

Turner's appeal be denied, that this Court uphold the summary judgment awarded by the
Trial Court, and that this Court award Dean her attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this
appeal as per the terms of the Agreement.

DATED this / 0

day of November, 2008.
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC

/Dav>cf P. HirschT
Jeffrey J. Steele
Attorneys for Appellee
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